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ABSTRACT
The paper first reviews the budget identities of the fiscal andmonetary
authorities and the solvency constraint or present value budget-constraint of
the consolidated public sector, for closed andopen economies. It then
discusses the new conventional wisdom concerning the fiscal roots of inflation
and the budgetary prerequisites for generating and stopping hyperinflation.The
popular rational expectations "Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic" model of
Sargent and Wallace has ambiguous inflation implications from an increase in the
fundamental deficit and is incapable of generating hyperinflatior,. Theonly
runaway, explosive or unstable behavior it can exhibit is "hyperdeflation"! In
the open economy, the need to maintain a managed exchange rateregime does not
impose any constraint on the growth rate of domestic credit, arising through the
government's need to remain solvent. Obstfeld's proposition to thecontrary is
due to the omission of government bonds and borrowing.
There is not yet any "deep structural" theory justifying the(exogenous)
lower bounds on the stock of foreign exchange reserves characteristic of the
collapsing exchange rate literature. Absent such a theory of "international
liquidity," one cannot model satisfactorily a foreign exchange crisis that is
not at the same time a government solvency crisis. Given such a lowerbound,
the existence or absence of a pecuniary opportunity cost toholding reserves is
shown to condition the fiscal and financial actions consistent withprolonged
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1. Introduction
It has long been recognized that monetary, fiscal and financial
policy cannot be determined independently. Like most insights in
economics, this one is rediscovered, repackaged and re—emphasized
periodically. Unfortunately, our subject is not one in which progress
in monotonic. Rather, half—truths gain acceptance and popularity,wax,
peak and wane in cyclical fashion, in order to be forgotten and
displaced by new half—truths until the next turn of the wheel. While
these cycles take place agiinst a steadily rising trend as regards
technical and mathematical sophistication and achievement, thereappears
to be, at any rate in the fields of macroeconomics and international
finance, no such positive trend at the conceptual level, or as regards
new ideas and insights about the way the economy works.
As a graduate student and beginning assistant professor, I
witnessed, and in a minor way contributed to, one of these periodic
revivals of the notion that there is one less degree of freedom in
monetary, fiscal and financial policy than an innocent bystander might
assume. Ott and Ott (1965), Dates (1966), Christ (1967, 1968), Silber
(1970), Blinder and Solow (1973), Tobin and Buiter (1976), Branson
(1976) and many others all added what was rather misleadingly called the
government budget constraint (or worse: the government budget
restraint) to the familiar static closed or open IS—LM models. In what
follows I sh?ll refer to this "government uses and sources of funds
statement' by the descriptively more accurate name of government or
public sector budget identity. The constraint on public sector fiscal
and financial choices will be reviewed below.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The remainder of this Section2
reviews the open economy public sector budget identity and characterizes
the public sector's intertemporal budget constraint or solvency
constraint. Section 2 reviews the fiscal determinants of long—run
inflation in the closed economy and points out some problems associated
with the casual application of a popular model of Sargent and Wallaceto
the analysis of hyperinflations. Section 3 returns to the open economy
and establishes, contrary to what has been asserted by Obstfeld,that
the need to maintain a managed exchange rate regime does not impose an
upper limit on the growth rate of domestic credit,if there is no
exogenously given lower bound on the stock of foreign reserves.If the
regime is viable (i.e. if the government is solvent) for anyrate of
domestic credit expansion (however low), then it is viable for all rates
of domestic credit expansion (however high). Section 4 reviews the
collapsing exchange rate literature for the case where there is an
exogenously given lower bound on the level of reserves.
Consider the following set of accounts for the monetary authority
(or Central Bank) and fiscal authority (or Treasury) of an open economy.
The nation's foreign exchange reserves are assumed to be held by the
Central Bank. Equation (1) is the monetary authority's budget identity;
equation (2) the fiscal authority's budget identity:
(I) S_eiR*_iD eR'D+M
(2).p(G+K)i(B+D)TSP'K04D
P1is•the nominal stock of base money (or high—powered money) which is
non—interest—bearing.B is the stock of government interest—bearing3
debt held outside the Central Bank. For simplicity only one kind of
debt with a fixed nominal market value in domesticcurrency and a
variable nominal interest rate i is considered. D is the stock of
government debt held by the monetary authority, i.e. the stock of
•domestic credit. The change in D, D is domestic credit expansion (dce),
the monetary target so dear to the IMF. R* is the stock of foreign
exchange reserves (denominated in foreign currency), i the interest
rate on reserves and e the spot foreign exchange rate.S is the
payments made by the Central Bank to the fiscal authority. 6 is the
volume of government consumption spending, K the public capital stock, I
taxes net of transfers (excluding payments by the Central Bank to the
fiscal authority) andthe real cash rate of return on the public
sector capital stock.(This need bear no relation whatsoever to the
social rate return on the public sector capital stock). To keep life
simple, p is the general price level, the price of government
consumption and the cost of a iini.t of public sector capital.
The (often implicit) assumption that the Central Bank pays to the
Treasury the entire amount it earns on its portfolio of domestic and
foreign assets (net of the costs of running the show, ignored here),
yields the familiar identity that
(3) _j+e*
•
Contrary to what is generally asserted, (3) cannot be derived by
differentiating both sides of the standard Central Bank balance sheet
reproduced below.4




Clearly, differentiating both assets and liabilities yields
. S S * *'
H=D+ eR + R e
The last term, capital gains (when positive) or losses (when
negative) on the stock of foreign exchange reserves due to changes in
the exchange rate, has to be got rid of. This is accomplished by adding
the missing entry, Central Bank net worth, W, to the liability side of
the balance sheet. With the further assumption that capital gains and
losses (here only due to exchange rate changes, but in more realistic
.dels also associated with changes in the market value of long—dated
dorestic government debt) are absorbed into net worth (WR*e), i.e.
are not monetied equation (3) emerges triumphant.
Adding (1) and (2) together yields the consolidated public sector
budget identity (4)
(4)
Witha bit of rearranging, the public sector budget identity (4)5
can be written as the differential equation in B —pX—eR*.givenin
equation (5). r denotes the rate of inflation and therate of p e
exchange rate depreciation.
(5) -_(B-pK-eR) i(B_pK_eR*) —
[T+M_P6—(i—(+n-))pK_(i_(i+€))eR*]
Solving (5) forward in time and imposing the terminal condition given in
(6), finally gives us a government budget constraint. Equation (7)
represents the government's intertemporal or present value budget
constraint or its solvency constraint.(See Buiter (1983a, b) and
Buiter (1985a)).
(6) Urn [B(v) -p(v)K(v)-
e(v)R*(v)}exp[_J i(u)du}
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+J [its — (c(s) + n(s)p(s)K(s) exp[—J' i(u)du ds
t t
+J [is - Ci(s) + €(s))]e(s)R*(s) exp[_5 i(u)du]ds.For simplicity I'll assume in most of what follows, that (6) and (7)
hold as strict equalities.
Equation (6) states that the present value of the governmentsnet
non—monetary tangible liabilities should ultimately be non-negative.
I
If (6) is violated, the public sector never repays its debts; instead it
plays a Ponzi game by borrowing more in order to serviceits already
outstanding debt.If (6) is satisfied, the growth rate of the nominal
value of the government's debt ultimately is less than the nominal
interest rate. Equivalent statements are that the growth rate of the
real value of the public debt ultimately is less than the real interest
rate ri—i7 or that the growth rate of the publicdebt—domestic
product ratio ultimately is less than r—n, where n is thetrend growth
rate of real domestic output. If (6) holds, then ultimately the
comprehensive primary (non—interest) government deficit (the second term
on the.right—hand—side of (5)), must become a surplus. Whilethe
validity of (6) is not uncontroversial (why should it be requiredto
hold e.g. if the growth rate of real output systematically exceeds the
real interest rate?), I'll assume it to be satisfied in what follows.
Note that even if (6) holds, net public debt and interest on the public
1It can easily be shown using integration by parts that (6) could be
replaced by (6') urn [pi(v)+B(v)_p(v)x(v)_e(v)R*(v)] exp(-j' i(u)du)
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i(s)M(s)exP{—J' i(u)du ds—tl(t).(See Buiter (1983 a, b)).
t
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debt can grow without bound, even relative to domestic output (if the
growth rate of net nominal debt, while ultimately less than i (to
satisfy (6)) exceeds n +r) Thiscan occur because the growing
government interest bill represents growing interest income to the
private sector.and therefore a growing tax base for the government. If
lump sum (non—distortionary) taxes can be raised one—for—one with the
increase in debt service, we could, as pointed out by flcCallum (1984)
and Obstfeld (1986) have an exploding, but sustainable public debt—GDP
ratio. Both the distortion,ary nature of real world taxes and the
existence of political and administrative constraints on the ability
indefinitely to raise taxes one—for—one with pre—tax income, suggest
that the case of the sustainable explosive net public debt—6DP ratio is
an example of economics strictly for econooists only.In what follows
it will often be safe to restrict the analysis to the case of a net
publicdebt—GDP ratio that is bounded from above.
Let us review briefly the items in the governments solvency
constraint (7).Itstates that the present discounted value of future
explicit taxes net of transfers I plus the present discounted value of
future money issues or seigniorage M should be sufficient to cover the
outstanding net tangible non—monetary liabilities of the government
(B—pK—eR')plus the present discounted value of future government
consumption spending p6.In addition, current and future tax and
seigniorage should cover any future drain (gain)on (to) the Exchequer
dueto the portunity cost of government borrowing i exceeding (falling
short of) the cash flow rate ofreturn generated by public sectora
capital,+n,and/ or due to the opportunity cost of government
borrowing exceeding (falling shDrt Df) the pecuniary rate of return on
international reserves, I+E. Note e.g. that if i ='+n,the existing
stock of public sector capital is entered "at cost" in the public sector
balance sheet as an asset, and future public sector capital formation is
not a charge on the government's solvency: unlike public consumption,
it. finances itself in the long run. Also note that in the case of an
ideal gold standard, i =0and 0.By holding a "barren" asset with
a zero nominal rate of return the government, presumably inorder to
maintain its international liquidity, weakens its solvency if the
nominal interest rate on its debt i is positive, as I shall assume
henceforth. Borrowing to defend the exchange rate (increasing B andeR*
by equal amounts) will then require either a reduction in the present
discounted value of the government.'s consumption program, an increase in
the present value of future taxes net of transfers or an increase in the
present value of future seigniorage in order to maintain solvency (see
Buiter (l9B6a)).
2.The Fiscal Roots of Inflation in A Closed Economy
Somewhere in the early 1980's the "New Classical" macroeconomics,
led by Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace, rediscovered the importance of
the government solvency constraint for monetary theory. It is possible
to date this quite precisely, because Sargent's well—known textbook,
Macroeconomic Theory (Sargent (1979)) still contains a section titled
'In Defense of Keynesian Analyses That "Ignore" the Government's Budget
Constraint" (Sargent (1979, pp 107—ill)), while the first of the papers9
analysing the fiscal origins of inflation (both hyper— and moderate)
appeared in 1981 and 1982 (see Sargent and Wallace (1981,1984), Sargent
(1982), and Sargent (1983)). Ironically, the New Classical rediscovery
of the government budget identity virtually coincided with the New
Cambridge rediscovery of the same identity by Godley and Cripps (1983).
The essence of Sargent and Wallaces argument (Sargent and Wallace
(1984)), is very simple. Throwing out foreign exchange reserves for the
moment, the publ2c debt—GDP ratio, b, and the public sector capital
stock —GOPratio, k, are kept constant.In the case of public debt,
this may reflect the fact that the debt burden has reached itsupper
limit, because of economic or political limits on the government's
ability to tax or for other reasons. Nominal debt issues, B, are
therefore just sufficient to offset the decline in the debt—GDP ratio
that would otherwise occur because of inflation or GOP growth (B =
(n+n-)B).Similarly, K =nK.For simplicity we consider only the case
wtere the share of exhaustive public spending in SOP, g, and the share
of taxes net of transfers in GOP, 'r, are constant. This permits us to
obtain the following expression for the proportional rate of growth of




v denotes the income velocity of circulation of money, v where V is
real output.10
The expression in square brackets on the right hand side of (8) is
a public sector deficit measure, but not the standard public sector
financial deficit (as a proportion of GDP) that is collected by the
national income and flow a-f funds statisticians. First the conventional
deficit is Ucorrectedui for the effects of inflation on the debt—6DP
ratio and for the effects of real growth on the debt—6DP and public
sector capital—BDP ratio. The interest component is therefore not
i(b—k), as it would be in the conventional accounts, but (r—n) (b—k).
Second, the primary (or non—interest) deficit in (B) only includes part
of public sector exhaustive spending. Public sector capital formation
is excluded and only consumption spending is included. (Transfers,
subsidies, etc. are of course negative entries in -r).Finally,
allowance is made for any difference between the governments
opportunity cost of borrowing and the cash rate of return it obtains
from the public sector capital stock (this cash return could of course
be negative). Thus the deficit that, given velocity, governs the
long—run or eventual r-ate of growth of the high—powered money stock is
the, inflation—and—real—growth-corrected, return—on—public sector
capital—adjusted—government current account (or consumption account)
deficit.(See Buiter
Given velocity, an increase in this "uinierlying" deficit will raise




In the long run, velocity settles down. Assuming that realgrowth
in the long run is independent of the rate of inflation, thelong—run
rate of inflation varies one—for—one with the rate of growth ofmoney.
Specifically, Sargent and Wallace (1984) focus on policies that raise
the debt burden b. Provided the interest rate exceeds the growth rate
of output and barring a reduction in the primary consumption deficit &
g—T+(r—)k an increase in the debt burden b will raise inflation.
Reductions in monetary growth without changes in the primary deficit
will force the authorities to borrow more to satisfy the budget
identity. The need to service the debt will eventually, after the debt
burden settles down at a higher level than it would have reached without
the earlier reduction in money growth, compel an eventual rate of
monetary growth rate which is higher than it would otherwise have been.
Thus, with constant velocity, lower money growth (and thus lower
inflation) now without a reduction in the primary consumption deficit,
leans higher money growth and higher inflation in the future.
If velocity is endogenous, an even less friendly outcomemay occur.
A standard assumption is that velocity is an increasing function of the
nominal interest rate, e.g.
(10) —
Y2(r+n') > 0; v 012
Sargent and Wallace (1984) show that in a very simple, very
classical model with an exogenous real interest rate and exogenous
output the following may happen: The response to an early reduction in
money growth followed by a later increase in money growth (due to the
higher debt service incurred through the increased borrowing during the
period of lower money growth) may be higher inflation both earlier and
later. The reason is that with endogenous velocity, a freely flexible
price level and rational, forward—looking expectations, the rate of
inflation today is a forward—looking exponentially weighted moving
average of all future rates of money growth, i.e. current inflation is
like a "present discounted value11 of future money growth.It is
possible that, in this present value calculation, the early lower rates
of money growth are dominated by the later higher rates of money growth,
leading to higher inflation throughout as a result of a decision to
lower money growth in the near term without implementing a "fundamental1
fiscal correction, i.e. a reduction in the primary consumption deficit.
With endogenous velocity, will a permanent increase in the
underlying deficit necessarily be associated with a higher rate of
inflation? Here the model begins to creak a bit.It is easily checked
that the non—linear model of equations (8), (9) and (10), with r,n,,
Ic,b, g and r exogenous can have zero, one or two stationary solutions
for n. When there are two solutions, the low inflation equilibrium is
locally unstable while the high inflation equilibrium is locally stable.
Following th precedent of linear rational expectations models with a
single non—predetermined state variable (velocity or the price level),
Sargent and Wallace (1984) focussed on the locally unstable, low13
inflation equilibrium. For this equilibrium, a permanent increase in
the underlying deficit does indeed raise inflation.If the locally
stable high inflation equilibrium had been chosen instead, a permanently
higher fundamental deficit would, in the long run, have been associated
with a lower rate of inflation. The analysis of the transitional
dynamics in this case would have suffered from the non—uniqueness
problem that is always present when a non—predetermined variable is
required to converge to a (locally) stable equilibrium: there is a
continuum of initial values of v or p that are consistent with
convergence to the steady state.
The model begins to creak even more loudly when it is used to
analyse hyperinflations. The spirit of this model did indeed motivate
Sargent's well—known study on this subject Sargent (1982) and (1986)).
There is unfortunately no way in this model to generate the kind of
explosive, unstable behavior characteristic of hyperinflations. When.
there are two stationary solutions, the only explosive behavior is with
reference to (and away from) the locally unstable low inflation
equilibrium. However, this unstable behavior represents an implosidn
rather than an explosion. The model generates a steadily growing rate
of deflation.
Successively larger values of the underlying deficit will move the
economy from the range characterized by two stationary equilibria,
through the rangewith one stationary equilibrium into the range with no
stationary equilibrium. Here there is again plenty of unstable behavior
but it too takes the form of 11hyperdeflations" rather than of
hyperinflaticns. One attempt to save the model for the analysis of14
hyperinflations is to restrict the analysis to the range of underlying
deficits for which there are two stationary equilibria and to call a
hyperinflation the transition from the low inflation stationary
equilibrium to the high inflation stationary equilibrium. This,
however, is silly. Both stationary equilibria are just that:
well—behaved long—run equilibria with constant, finite rates of
inflation. There is nothing 'runaway" or explosive about the transition
from the low to the high inflation steady state. In fact the move from
the low inflation equilibrium to te high inflation equilibrium involves
initially an acce'erating rate of inflation (r rises) but ultimately a
decelerating rate of inflation (r' falls) withsmoothly apprDaching
zero as the economy eases into the high inflation steady state.(See





To describe the traverse from to as a hyperinflation isakinto
describing a mild summer breeze as a hurricane.(See also Buiter
(1985b).
Where does this leave us? An equation like (8) provides a useful
benchmark for evaluating the long—term money growth consequences of a
given fiscal—financial package. Apart from specifying the
fiscal—financial benchmarks (g, r, k and b), we must be able to
determine velocity, v, the real interest rate r and the :ash rate of
return on public sector capital ,inorder to calculate ,i.Theobvious
conclusion in a constant—velocity framework, that a higher underlying
deficit implies a higher eventual rate of growth of money, becomes
ambiguous even in the simple rational—expectations, flexible price
level, exogenous output version of the endoçenous velocity model.
Unlike the adaptive expectations (Cagan (1956)) version of this model,
the Sargent and Wallace (1984) rational expectations version cannot
generate hyperinflations. Next we extend these insights to the case of
an open economy with a managed exchange.rate.
3.What Constrains Domestic Credit Expansion Under a Planaged Exchange
Rate?
A •anaged exchange rate regime is any rule for setting the nominal
spot exchange rate. In what follows I restrict the analysis to
open—loop rules, and withing this class of rules to those involving a
constant proportional rate of depreciation or appreciation of the
no.inal spot exchange rate. Post of the results will apply unchanged to16
more general closed—loop or feedback rules for determining the exchange
rate.I assume there to be a unified spot exchange market and no
capital controls or other foreign exchange restrictions. Unless
otherwise indicated, there is perfect capital mobility and perfect
substitutability between foreign bonds and domestic bonds. Uncovered
interest parity CUIP) therefore holds. If i denotes the nominal
interest rate on riskless fDreign bonds, then
(11)i = +
2
I ignore direct currency substitution. The formal analysis goes
through even with direct currency substitution, as long as it is less
than perfect.. With a managed exchange rate, the stock of foreign
exchange reserves adjusts passively to reconcile the private sector's
demand for money and the stock of domestic credit chosen by the monetary
authorities. Money' demand equals money supply at each instant. When
the authorities decide no longer to supply the foreign exchange demanded
at the prevailing exchange rate, the managed exchange rate regime
collapses. Many variants exist on what takes its place.
I shall deal only with he simplest case of a free float of
indefinite duration. A few of the possible alternatives are:a
2Here, as elsewhere, rational expectations are assumed. In the not
explicitly stochastic formal analysis summarized here, actual and
expected depreciation therefore coincide. Uncertainty is considered
explicitly in many of the papers on the subject, e.g. Flood and Garber
(1984), Buiter (1986a, b), Grilli (1986) etc.17
temporary float followed by a new managed exchange rate; a discrete
devaluation (or "maxi—devaluation") followed by the adoption of another
exchange rate management rule; the imposition of foreign exchange
controls and/or a two—tier foreign exchange market etc.
What limitations does the need to maintain a managed exchange rate
regime put on the domestic credit expansion (dce) policies that can be
pursued by the authorities? First consider the case considered by
Obstfeld (1986a) where i= i = i—€ andthere is therefore no financial
opportunitycost to the government of holding foreign exchange reserves.
In this case, the only reason why the government could beprevented from
running down one of its financial assetsto an arbitrarily large
negative value isthat its overall financial positionis insolvent.If
thathappens, the government runs out of credit everywhere, i.e. it
encounters a limitation on it.s ability to borrow in any form. Barring
insolvency, if reserves are required, the government can borrow them
abroad. An infinite credit line is no problem in such a world. There
is no reason, in orther words, why reserves cannot become anarbitrarily
large negative number.. Alternatively, one could visualize the
authorities as acquiring an infinite stock of reserves at the inception
of the managed exchange rate regime, financed by issuing an infinite
amount of debt with no net effect on public sector net worth and
solvency. To see this, consider equations (6) and (7). Assume given
paths of taxes—net—of—transfers i(s), public consumption spending G(s)
and public sector capital formation K(s) (and thus K(s). The interest
rate ifs) is given by (11) and the exogenously given path of the nominal
exchange rate. For simplicity, letand real output V be exogenous andia
letthe domestic price level be given by the law of one price, i.e.
(12)p =p*e
is the exogenous world price level. The analysis can be extended to
incorporate non—traded goods, endogenous terms of trade and sluggish
price adjustment.
The answer to the question "what limit- on dce policies are imposed
by the need to maintain a managed exchange rate is: unone whatsoever.
Of course the real value of seigniorage that can be extracted by the
monetary authorities may be a function of the path of the nominal
exchange rate (i.e. specifically of the (expected) proportional rate of
depreciation otheexchange rate),butthis has nothing to do with the
choiceof dce -for a given path of the exchange rate. Consider the
budget identity in equation (5)again.With the assumptions made so
far, everything on the right—hand—side of that equation is determined.
(Notefrom equation (10) that with r and E constant and with foreign
inflation denoted TT*,seigniorageis given by 11 =(n+€+rr)M).With the
path of K also given, the fiscal program, and the growth in the demand
for money fully determine the behavior ofthegovernments non—monetary
financial liabilities, B—eR'. Government solvency requires, from
equation (6) (and ignoring public sector capital) thatB—eR' grows
ultimately at a proportional rate less thaD the nominal interest rate.
The behavior of BeR' is quite independent .3f the path of domestic
credit expansion, which only determines the composition of the given
change in B—eR' between changes in B and changes in-eR'. Specifically,19
higher dce will, since eR*N—D, lead to lower and lower B, with
B_CR* unchanged: the authoritiesrun down foreign exchange reserves
more rapidly but borrow less. Specifically, and in contradiction to
the analysis of Obstfeld (1986a, pp. 9—12), domestic credit cangrow at
a proportional rate in excess of the nominal interest rate; this will of
course lead to reserve losses, possibly at a proportional rate in excess
of the nominal interest rate. What matters for solvency, however, is
the ultimate proportional growth rate of B_eR*. If this is less than
the nominal interest rate for any rate of dce it will be less than the
nominal interest rate for all rates of dce, however high, because
solvency when i =iis independent of the dce policy. By not
considering government borrowing, (other than by running down foreign
exchange reserves), the asymptotic constraint on the growth rate of
B_eR* becomes a constraint on._eR* in Obstfid'sanalysis.In other
words, with 0 ,changesin dce are ipso facto changes in the
public sector deficit. With seigniorage independent of dce under a
managed exchangea rate regime, changes in dce are also ipso facto
changes in the rate at which reserves are ru' down. With B 0 ,the
consequences for solvency of a change in the public sector deficit are
erroneously attributed to the change in dce.
On the right hand side of equation (7), the last term (which
involves R*) will vanish when =i=i€.Apart from this last term,
enters only with B as B_eR*. This indicates that any stock—shift
open market sale or purchase of government debt will, since it leaves
B_eR* unchanged, leave thesolvency of the government's fiscal—f.inancial
program unaffected.20
It could of course happen that equation (6) is violated for the
given fiscal program (i(s), 6(s), K(s)) and for the path of seigniorage
(M(s)) generated by the exchange rate management rule chosen by the
authorities. Given the exchange rate rule, the government then is
insolvent for any dce rate. Depending on the nature of the money demand
function, i.e. on the way in which seigniorage varies with the chosen
exchange rate path (or with the exchange rate path generated when the
exchange rate is left to float freely) a different exchange rate rule
(or a free or dirty float) aay restore solvency to the government even
without changes in the paths of current and future 1, 6 or K. The money
demand function given in equation (10) e.g. has real seigniorage varying.
with the nomin.31 interest rate. All this, however, doesnt change the
proposition that if reserves carry the same interest rate as government
debt, the solvenc.y of a given managed exchange rate regime is not
contingent on the growth rate of domestic credit.
Now consider the case where reserves earn less than government
debt. For simolicity consider the case where i = 0,as would be
the case with an ideal gold standard, and i> 0. From equation (7) it
is clear that setting oneself up with a larger stock of reserves (let
alone an infinitely large stock) now hurts solvency. A stock—shift open
market sale of government debt (equal increases in B and eR) will now,
for a given path of dce, raise the value of the last term on the
right—hand—side of equation (7). Since a non—interest—bearing asset is
acquired by issuing an interest—bearing liability, solvency is impaired.
On the other hand, given any initial stocks of debt, capital and
reserves, and given future trajectories for 1, 6 and K, higher rates of21
domestic credit expansion will improve solvency, by permitting the
government to run down non—interest—bearing foreign exchange reserves
rather than issue interest—bearing debt. When i =0,equations (6) and







(7') ji(s)exP[_J' i(u)du ds +
j D(s) exp[—J'
i(u)du ds
t t t t
￿ B(t) —p(t)K(t)
Cor









Equations (6') and (7') and the budget identity
-(B—pK)i(B—pK) —Ei—pG—(i—(+n-))pK]—D
make it apparent that government solvency 3gain doesn't put any upper
limits on dcc rates whatsoever. Quite the contrary, by choosing a
sufficiently high rate of dce, otherwise insolvent fiscal—financial
plans can be made solvent. Why should large negative reserve holdings
matter, when the government's balance sheet is strengthened by
substituting reserve financing for borrDwing? Cet.par. higher dcc makes
it easier for debt (B) to grow (ultimately) at a rate less than i and22
thus to satisfy (6').
The upshot is that the government budget identity and solvency
constraint literature really hasn't taught us anything about the need
for international reserves, the reasons for foreign exchange rate crises
and the fiscal and dce prerequisites for a viable managed exchange rate
regime. When =i=i—E,onewould not expect to see an exchange
rate crisis that isn't also a debt crisis. A selling attack on the
currency should be accompanied by the government's interest—bearing debt
(even when this is denominated in terms of foreign currency,
index—linked or whatnot> selling at a discount relative to its nominal
parity. Here an exchange rate crisis is a purely fiscal phenomenon.
When i =0,and more generally when i < i =i€borrowing worsens
future deficit5 while running down reserves doesn't, and the reasons for
foreign exchan;e crises that aren't also solvency crises are even less
apparent.
A satisfactory theory of foreign exchange crises in spite of
solvency requires two ingredients, both missing thus far. First, a
reason for the existence of a specific class of financial or real claims
required in international exchange and distinct from general credit.
Second, a reason given why these 'required' reserves cannot be borrowed
instantaneously. Deeper theory is needed here than is offered by the
ad—hoc and question—begging open economy cash—in—advance model, to
provide acceptable microeconomic foundations of the alleged unique
transactions role of certain reserve assets and of the alleged inferior
liquidity characteristics.of-other financial or real claims, (some of
which may be liabilities of the same agent that issue the reserves).
Reserve assets with these two features will indeed provide a rationale23
for the existence of a lower bound on the stock of reserves atany
instant. Limits on the government's ability to tax will set a finite
upper bound on the government's net—interest—bearing debt—output ratio,
but this involves an upper limit on B_eR* when i =iand an upper
limit on B wheo i =0,and never a lower limit on R*.
Given such a limit, it becomes possible to generate scenarios in
which there could be a run on the currency without a default risk
discount DII the public debt.
Advanced industrial countries like the Netherlands, which are
tightly integrated into a sophisticated system of international
'financial markets do, however, seem to be poorly characterized bya
model in which significant penalties are attached to holding inadequate
quantities of a limited class of international reserve assets or in
wh•ich there are non—trivial d.elaysin the process through which the
Centrar Bank can raise readily spendable resources. Indeed thevery
meaning of 'international reserves becomes fuzzy for such countries, as
the official balance sheet contains both highly liquid,
market—rates—of—interest—bearing—assets and highly liquid,
•arket—rates—of—interest—bearing—Jjabjljties and as unused lines of
credit, swap arrangements etc. are available to back the Bank's resolve
to defend the parity.(See Dooley (1986) and Buiter (l986c)). For such
a country a foreign exchange crisis is neither more nor less than a
fiscal or saJvency crisis, which doesn't, however, make itany easier to
solve.
The final section reviews some of the results derived in models
wherean ad—hoc exogenous lower bound on R', which without loss of
generality I choose to be zero, is assumed to exist.24
4. Running Out of Reserves
Consider the case of a small open economy which manages the
exchange rate (i.e. fixesat some constant level) as long as the stock
of international reserves is positive, but adopts a free float once
reserves fall below zero.
A quick check on the .viability of the managed exchange rate regime
involves the comparison of the eventual rate of growth of the money
stock from equation (B), say, and the rate of growth of money demand
A
underthe managed rate, + n——, where,from (10) v =0if r
* A
+ +is constant. If p exceeds ,u the reserve threshold will be
crossed eventually, and the regime will collapse.
It is, however, possible to be more precise about the nature
(including the magnitude) and the timing of a collapse.It is easiest
to think of thi5 in the conte.xt ofa "structurally weak" currency i.e.
one fort which dce systematically exceeds money demand growth (though
both may be skochastic). An eventual collapse is therefore certain.
In the case of structurally weak currency, the (endogenous)
expected proportional rate of currency depreciation after the collapse
will typically be higher than the exogenous proportional rate of
depreciation of the managed exchange rate. With UIP this means that the
nominal interest rate increases at the moment the managed exchange rate
regime collapses. If the demand for money is a declining function of
the nominal rate of interest, there will be a stock—shift reduction in
the demand for money at the moment the managed exchange rate regime
collapses. Biven dce, this stock—shift reduction in money demand is
reflected in a stock—shift reduction in the stock of reserves to the25
critical threshold level. This final stock—shift purchase by the
private sector of the monetary authoritys remaining foreign exchange
reserves has been called a uspeculative attack." Even though the
exogenous shocks to money demand and dce may be small, the final
depletion of the official reserves includes an endogenous component
(reflecting the increase in the nominal interest rate and the interest
sensitivity of money demand) which may be large relative to the final
exogenous shocks that triggered the attack.. The top panel of Figure 2
illustrates this for the case of a continuous time model where the
instantaneous exogenous shocks are infintesmal relative to the
outstanding stock of reserves. ENcept at the moment the attack occurs,
at t1, the stock of reserves declines in a continuous fashion. (See
Krugman (1979)5 Flood and Garbei- (1984), Obstfeld (1984), Buiter
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A convenient device for calculating the timing (or in stochastic
models the probability density function of the timing) of a collapse is
the "shadow floating exchange rate," e.The shadow floating exchange
rate at time t is the floating exchange rate that would prevail at time
t if the managed exchange rate regime were to collapse at that instant.
If the dce process does not change if and when the managed exchange rate
system collapses, the managed regime is viable as long as the shadow
exchange rate is below the managed rate but. collapses the first timethe
shadow floating rate exceeds the managed rate. The lower panel in
Figure 2 illustrates this for the case of a fixed exchange rate, e.
The reason is that private speculators would, if e > e, buy up the
remaining foreign exchange reserves of the authorities and force an
abandonment of the managed rate. The floating rate that would result
would be> e, thus giving the speculators handsome excess returns on
their purchase cc the foreign exchange reserves. The "efficient
markets" requirement that there can be no anticipated excess returns
locates the date of the collapse at the first crossing of e by ;from
below. Note the strong parallels with the literature on the collapse of
price stabilization schemes for commodities, through buffer stocks etc.
The collapsing exchange rate regime literature is indeed a (recognized)
offspring of this older literature (see especially Salant and Henderson
(1978) and Salant (1983)>.
There is an important caveat here, as was pointed out by Obstfeld
in an elegant paper (Obstfeld (1986b)), which applied a chain of
reasoning similar to that used by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in their27
analysis of "commercial bank runs."If the nature of the dcc process
varies according as to whether there is a managed exchange rate or a
freely floating exchange rate in effect, there may be multiple
equilibria and "bootstrap" or rational and self—fulfilling balance of
payments crises. Consider the case where in the absence of an attack,
the fixed exchange rate regime is indefinitely viable.In the absence
of a speculative attack, e.g., the dcc process and the growth of money
demand are such that the stock of reserves follows a stationary (or
stable) Firstorder autoregressive process with random shocks that have
bounded support, i.e.
(13) = 4u,faI < 1, u < Ut<ii
Giventhis specification, will always be above1—a)' and below
(assuming it started off between these two values).If the
reserve threshold is below u(l—o)', there can be no unatural collapse
of the fixed exchange rate, i.e. no collapse without a speculative
attack. Could a speculative attack ever be rational under these
circumstances? Consider the case where, if the fixed exchange rate
regime were to collapse, the authorities would change their dcc policy
from the restrained one which generates (13) to a wildly expansionary
one which would generate a very much higher expected rate of exchange
depreciation and a very much higher nominal interest rate than under the
fixed rate.It is now possible, as Ubstfeld Cl986b) shows, that if
private agents expect a run to take place in a period, it will be28
profitable for them to participate in it, because the shadow exchange
rate in that period exceeds the fixed exchange rate.If they dont
expect a run, they will refrain from buying up the authorities'
remaining reserves, and this decision too will be validated because
without a run reserves stay above their minimum threshold level. The
events that trigger the belief that a run will occur can be totally
extraneous. Since what permits such self—rationalizing attacks is the
expectations—validating dce behavior of the' authorities in the event of
an attacks policy makers can avoid them by abandoning their policy of
responding to collapses in that manner.
In Buiter (1986a) dce is broken down into its components: the
primary deficit, interest payments and government lending. Borrowing to
defend the exchange rate, i.e. holding constant the primary deficit and
engaging in a once—off stock—shift open market sale, will, if reserves
earn an interest rate below the rate on government debt, lower the
likelihood of an early collapse (by raising the level of the stock of
reserves) but increase the likelihood of a collapse in the longer run
(by raising the rate at which reserves are being run down).If there is
no financial oppOrtunity cost, as pointed out before, an open market
sale will lower the likelihood of a collapse for all future periods.
Finally, n Buiter (l9B6b), which develops an approach initiated in
Grilli (1986), the collapsing managed exchange rate regime literature is
put in a (very simple) two—country setting, where speculative selling
attacks against either currency can forcethe system off the managed
standard. Wher holding reserves involves a pecuniary opportunity cost,29
dce management in both countries is required to avoid crossingreserve
thresholds and management of the primary deficits is required to avoid
the possibility of reserve stabilization leading to public debt
destabilization. In a stochastic environment even the policy
combination of 1) no sterilization of reserve gains or losses and 2)
continuously balanced budgets, may not be capable of safeguarding both
the managed exchange rate system and fiscal solvency.
It should not come as a surprise that there is nothing automatic
about the viability of managed exchange rate systems, even one as
rarified as an idealized gold standard. When survival of the exchange
rate system is defined in terms of reserve thresholds and solvency in
terms of a debt burden threshold, it is to be expected that dce and
primary deficit policies that are consisten'. with survival should "feed
back" from these stocks or stock—flow ratios. Open—loop dce and fiscal
policies in a stochastic environment are bound to spell disaster.
5.Conclusion.
In a recent paper, Helpman and Razin (1986) make the following apt
observation.
"It is now understood that exchange rates cannot be managed without
the pursuit of other policies which make the entire package
internally consistent. ...Governmentsor central banks can only
temporarily target exchange rates without giving due attention to
other policies. However, eventually they have to choose or are
forced to choose measures which validate ex—post the feasibility of30
their exchange rate policy. These measures will typically be
anticipated by economic agents during the initial periods of
exchange rate management, thereby generating immediate pressure in
various markets. Hence, the success of exchange rate management
policy depends to a large extent on other policies, commitments to
future policies, and their effects on expectations." (Helpman and
Razin (1986), p. 1)
This paper has tried to make concrete the points made by Helpman
and Razin in the above quote and it underwrites completely their
general argument. The specific propositions that emerge do, however,
contradict or qualify a certain amount of recent conventional wisdom.
One such qualification applies to the effect of larger public sector
deficitson the rate of inflation when velocity is endogenous. A rather
basic flaw in some popular models of hyperinflation also stands out.
The meaning and relevance of reserve thresholds in a world with solvent
governments than can borrow at home and abroad is still unclear. A
recent proposition that the government solvency constraint implies a
limit on dce growth if a managed exchange rate regime is to survive
appears incorrect.
One encouraging (or surprising?) fact is that managed exchange rate
regimes have been in existence for long periods of time, including the
present, in spite of this absence of a satisfactory "deep theory." The
analogy with driving a car comes to mind:I can get it to work although
I havent a clue why or how it works. The difference is that in the
case of cars there are (I presume) those who truly do know and
understand. As regards managed exchange rate regimes 1m not so sure.31
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